Part II

Ideology, nationalism and modernity

5 Nationalism: restructuring Gellner's theory

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Introduction

The main thesis of this study is that, if one replaces Gellner's concept of *industria* with that of modernity, it is easier to identify mechanisms that non-teleologically link the structural conditions of modernity with the development of nationalism.

Modernity is here defined as the type of social organisation which became dominant in Western Europe after England's industrial revolution and the French Revolution. It entails the irreversible decline of the non-differentiated traditional community and the large-scale mobilisation and inclusion of the population into the centre. This unprecedented 'bringing-in' process portrays two unique structural features: (a) the deep, unmediated penetration by the state into the periphery, and (b)the top-down differentiation of a social formation's institutional spheres.[1]

State penetration

At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, owing to growing inter-state geopolitical struggles, as well as the rapid development of new communicative and organisational technologies, the 'infrastructural' powers of the state assumed unprecedented dimensions.[2] Expanding state bureaucracies managed to break the relative self-containment of traditional, local communities and to penetrate the periphery to a degree that had been unthinkable in premodern social formations, however despotic.

This penetration led to a massive transfer of material resources from the periphery to the centre, to the concentration at the top of the means

[1] For a more detailed discussion of the concept of modernity viewed in structural rather than cultural terms, see Mouzelis (1999).

[2] For the concept of the infrastructural State powers, see Mann (1993, 1996).

not only of production but equally those of domination and violence.[3] In addition it meant a transfer of symbolic resources to the centre, as the means of persuasion and education also became concentrated at the top – people identifying less with their local community and more with the 'imagined community' of the nation-state (Anderson 1991).

The inclusion into the centre could be and was both autonomous and heteronomous. In the former case it saw the spread of rights – civic, political, social-economic – to the lower strata (e.g. in nineteenth-century Britain). In the second case people were brought into the centralised arenas of the nation-state (the army, the taxation system) but were 'left out' in respect of political rights (e.g. nineteenth-century Prussia). In both cases, however, the relations between rulers and ruled were *unmediated* – in the sense that there were no or only very weak feudal and/or patrimonial intermediaries between the population and the centralised state apparatus (Bendix 1969).

The combination of 'penetrative' administrative technologies and relations of domination in unmediated fashion concentrating material and non-material resources at the top constitutes a mode of domination which has an elective affinity with nationalism. From this perspective, nationalism can be conceptualised as a discourse adopted by political elites for promoting, institutionalising, legitimising a mode of domination characterised by deep, unmediated state penetration of the periphery and the massive concentration of material and symbolic resources at the top.

Before illustrating this with a concrete example, I shall focus briefly on the second unique structural feature of modernity.

Top-down differentiation

As Talcott Parsons pointed out, modern societies are characterised by the differentiation of institutional spheres (economic, political, social, cultural), each one portraying, at least potentially, its own logic and values (Parsons 1977). Premodern complex social formations too portrayed a high level of socio-structural and cultural differentiation (Eisenstadt 1963, 1990), but there the differentiation was confined to the top, the social base being characterised by segmental forms of social organisation.[4] It was only in the modern nation-state that 'segmental

[3] See on this point Tilly (1990).

[4] Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production is a very good illustration of this type of differentiation at the top. See Hindess and Hirst (1975).

localism' declined irreversibly, this leading to a top-down differentiation of institutional spheres.

Following Parsons (1966, 1977), the differentiation of institutional or role structures generates problems of *social integration*. When we look at differentiated units in terms of roles, it is obvious that the replacement of rather diffuse by more specialised roles affects coordination. The difficulty can be solved only by the emergence of more abstract, more general and hence more flexible, less situation-specific values and ideas, able to subsume the more specific normative logic of the differentiated roles or role/institutional complexes (Parsons 1966: 22). Once 'value-generalization is achieved, a society acquires greater "adaptive capacity" for moving up the evolutionary ladder,' (Parsons 1964).

As I have argued elsewhere (Mouzelis 1993), Parsons considers that the major differentiated institutional spheres of modern societies have a tendency to achieve integration or 'social equilibrium' in quasi-automatic manner: social mechanisms establish a balance between the values of productivity/wealth creation in the economic (adaptation) subsystem, those of democracy in the political (goal achievement) subsystem, those of solidarity in the social (integration) subsystem, and those of value commitment in the cultural (latency) subsystem. However, looking at actual historical developments we find that, Parsons notwithstanding, integration is achieved less by inter-institutional equilibria than by the *dominance* of one institutional sphere over others.

In early modernity there was a marked tendency for integration to be achieved via the dominance of the *political* rather than the economic sphere (Mouzelis 1999). This is not surprising if one takes into account that, contra Marx, it was state rather than market expansion that constituted the chief motor force of modernisation. Indeed, given the relatively late development and dominance of industrial capitalism (middle to end of the nineteenth century), it was inter-state geopolitical struggles that were responsible for the decline of 'segmental localism' and the deep state penetration of the periphery. Particularly during the Napoleonic Wars, the creation of huge citizens' armies led to a phenomenal increase in military expenditure. In order to extract the required resources from civil society, state elites had to develop extensive administrative structures, which undermined the traditional, non-differentiated communities' relative self-containment (Mann 1993, 1996; Tilly 1990).

If political rather than economic mechanisms integrated the differentiated institutional spheres of early modernity, this more systemic perspective allows us to conceptualise nationalism as another one of those integrating mechanisms. More specifically, it can be linked with Parsons' 'integration/value-generalization' process. As a discourse

stressing the value of identification of and commitment to a broad entity that transcends local kinship and communal institutions – i.e. as a more *context-free* medium of co-ordination and communication – it helps to integrate the differentiated role structures of modern societies.

To conclude this section: if nationalism from the point of view of actors' strategic conduct can be seen as a discourse by state elites who promote and legitimise a penetrative and centralising mode of domination, from a more systemic institutional-analysis point of view[5] it can be understood as a relatively context-free medium enhancing impersonal communication and, in various ways, integrating the differentiated institutional spheres of the nation-state's 'imaginary community'.

The development of Greek nationalism

I shall illustrate the above conceptualisation of nationalism by taking as a concrete example nineteenth-century Greek nationalism.

Before the final and successful national uprising in 1821 against Ottoman rule, the bulk of the peasantry, given the limited spread of nationalist ideas in the countryside, did not have any clear political goals. Most of the people were concerned less with political independence from the Turks than with a return of the 'good old days' when a strong Ottoman state was able to safeguard their traditional rights and so check the predatory conduct of landlords and local officials (Stavrianos 1959). The promoters of the 'modern', 'new', nationalist ideas were diaspora Greek merchants, Western-educated professionals, and an intelligentsia influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution. In other words, peasants and artisans constituted the raw material, the energy source of the nationalist uprising, whereas it was a fraction of the merchant class and the intelligentsia which operated as a catalyst directing popular energies into nationalist channels (Crawley 1957). It was they who provided leadership as well as material and symbolic resources in a society hitherto dominated by the anti-Enlightenment, anti-Western orientations of the Greek Orthodox Church.

In fact the church, the Phanariote aristocracy at the imperial centre, and the Greek landowners were very ambivalent towards the Greek national uprising.[6] At the beginning the church (especially the high

[5] For the distinction between institutional analysis and analysis in terms of 'strategic conduct', see Giddens (1984: 289).

[6] For the role played by the church, the Phanariotes (Greeks living in the Phanari district of Constantinople and occupying key positions in the Ottoman patrimonial administration) and the landowning classes during the nationalist uprising, see Stavrianos (1963: 17ff).

clergy) was downright hostile to any idea of overthrowing the Ottoman rule under which it occupied so privileged a position. The Patriarchate, exercising political and spiritual power over all the Orthodox Christian subjects of the empire (Greek and non-Greek), realised that the emergence of new autonomous states in the Balkans would fragment not only Ottoman rule but also its own power position. Moreover, the fact that Greek nationalism was greatly influenced by the Enlightenment values of the West provided an additional reason for opposition. In parallel, the Phanariote aristocracy at the *Porte*, although initially responsive to Western ideas, was rather opposed to the Greek nationalist movement. Their privileged position within the Ottoman administration, their close links with the church and their cosmopolitan orientation explain their reluctance to join the revolution (Svoronos 1972). As far as the Greek landlords were concerned, they – whether involved in trade or not – were initially against any idea of nationalist uprising because they feared that the peasants would demand land reforms. It was only when the above privileged groups realised the irreversibility of the nationalist revolt that they threw their weight behind the insurgents and so contributed to its final success (Stoianovich 1963).

Inevitably, as soon as the uprising gained momentum, the diverging interests of the various actors involved came to the fore and resulted in internecine fighting that seriously threatened the ultimate success of the insurrection.

The struggles among Greeks during the later phases of the revolt (in so far as they did not arise from purely regional differences and kinship alliances) were due to the basic conflict between those who wanted to 'modernise', 'Westernise' Greece by establishing a strong centralised state which would eliminate regional fragmentation and the politico-military autonomy of local potentates, and those who wanted simply to oust the Turkish overlords but not to change the traditional, decentralised patrimonial structures.[7] For obvious reasons the traditionalist policy appealed to the autochthonous landowning-cum-merchant groups, whereas the modernising, centralising policies attracted the intelligentsia and the diaspora merchants who, having kept their wealth abroad, did not risk very much by pursuing the 'progressive' strategy. At the end of the protracted civil war the 'Westernisers', despite their poor control of local resources, managed to impose their views on the *form* at least that the future political institutions of modern Greece were to take. This was

[7] For an account of social conflicts and the linkages between kinship, regional and class differences during the early nineteenth century, see Petropoulos (1968) and Diamandouros (1972).

due both to the fact that they possessed the legal and administrative skills for running the new-born state, and to the fact that they enjoyed greater support from the Western powers (Diamandouros 1972). This last point is crucial, given that the nationalist insurrection, jeopardised by the civil war, was finally salvaged only by the active intervention of the 'Great Powers' (England, France and Russia).

It was, therefore, the leading role of the diaspora merchant class and the Westernised intelligentsia before and during the War of Independence and their partial victory over the more traditional, autochthonous oligarchy that explain to a great extent why nationalist ideas prevailed from the very start. They resulted in a persistent effort to organise the newly formed state along Western, centralising, state-penetrating-the-periphery lines, despite the overall poor economic development and the absence of a strong, Western-type autochthonous capitalist class (Mouzelis 1978: 14–17).

On the other hand, the victory of the Westernisers was very relative indeed. Although they succeeded in imposing a centralising, Western mode of domination, the autochthonous elite did not accept the new state of affairs without putting up strong resistance. During the first three decades of the post-independence period there was constant tension between the centralising efforts of the monarchical administration and the centrifugal tendencies of the various regional potentates striving to maintain the autonomy they had enjoyed in the past. For instance, the anti-monarchical, so-called 'democratic revolutions' of 1844 and 1862 (which curtailed the powers of the crown and strengthened the political parties) were not so much popular victories as oligarchic attempts to stop the centralising tendencies of the state. Eventually the local revolts against state expansion and penetration petered out as local oligarchies, realising the irreversibility of the centralising and penetrative process, attempted to colonise the state apparatus from within (Mouzelis 1978: 141–4).

The same macro-historical process seen from a systemic institutional perspective shows a rather week socio-cultural differentiation during the pre-independence period. For instance, in view of the political-representation functions of the Orthodox Church vis-à-vis the imperial centre, there was no clear differentiation between religious, political, judicial and educational roles at local or regional level. Under Ottoman rule, the Church elites, although subjected to strict and often arbitrary, 'sultanistic' control,[8] not only enjoyed a high degree of autonomy

[8] For the term *sultanism*, implying an extreme form of arbitrary, despotic, patrimonial rule, see Weber (1978).

in religious, cultural and educational matters, but also acquired an important number of political functions. So, with the local notables, the church was responsible for the running of all municipal affairs (Papadopoulos 1952; Arnakis 1952: 235–50).

With the establishment of the modern Greek state, however, came a clean differentiation between religious, political, cultural and educational roles. Almost all the political functions that had previously been exercised by the church authorities were transferred to newly established ministries. Therefore, after independence political and religious institutions and roles were much more clearly differentiated on every level (village, community, region, nation).

This top-down differentiation took a specific form, of course: religious roles and institutions being definitely subordinated to political ones, it was via the dominance of the political that the differentiated institutional spheres became integrated. Given the ambiguous, weak role that the high clergy had played during the national uprising, it is understandable why the holders of the centralised means of domination managed quite early on (a) to establish the autonomy of the autochthonous church vis-à-vis the Patriarchate in Constantinople, and (b) to put religious authorities, now stripped of their political functions, under the direct control of state elites. As a matter of fact, the 1833 ecclesiastical constitution of the autonomous Greek Orthodox Church (which followed the lines of the German Protestant tradition), put the church under the strict control of the government (Frazer 1969). In fact, until the rise of the charismatic, populistically orientated and political power-seeking Archbishop Christodoulos in the 1990s, the church was more or less an administrative extension of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs.

If we now focus on nationalism as a generalised medium transcending localistic attachments which, at the same time, integrated the relatively differentiated religious, judicial, educational and political role structures of the Greek nation-state, we find two fundamental unifying themes. The first stressed the unbroken continuity of modern Hellenism with the civilisation of ancient Greece. The Western concern with classical antiquity, having been imported wholesale into Greece in the nineteenth century, was then incorporated into a nationalist discourse that established (particularly after the development of European Romanticism with its glorification of *la patrie*) linkages between ancient Greece, Byzantium and modern Hellas.[9]

[9] The major architect of this view of Greek history was Constantine Paparrigopoulos (1925), the nineteenth-century 'national' historian *par excellence*. His multi-volume magisterial *History of the Greek Nation* attempts to refute theories like those of Fallmerayer

This notion of the three-stage macro-developement of the Greek nation proceeded from the idealisation and glorification of the past to a grandiose vision of the future. It inspired – and this is the second unifying theme – an irredentism which, particularly during the middle of the nineteenth century, took the form of the *Megali Idea* (the Great Idea): the Romantic vision that it was the sacred mission of the newly established modern Greek state to reconquer Constantinople and resurrect Byzantium. The *Megali Idea* led, on the one hand, to the gradual broadening of the national boundaries via the incorporation into the Greek polity of not only Thessaly and the islands but also some of the northern territories of Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace. On the other hand it resulted, in the early 1920s, in the (for Greece) disastrous Greco-Turkish war, which put an abrupt end to the nationalist project of a Byzantine revival (Mouzelis 1990: 110ff).

What should be stressed from the point of view of this chapter is that both the notion of the 3000-year-long 'unbroken continuity' of the Greek nation and its irredentist consequences constituted during the late nineteenth century the most powerful symbolic resource for mobilising the Greek-speaking population, and so contributed to shifting orientations and attachments from the periphery to the national centre. It in fact constituted a very effective *integrating mechanism* of the differentiated economic, political, social and cultural institutional spheres of the Greek nation-state.

Restructuring Gellner's theory

Gellner links nationalism, as a predominantly modern social construction, to two core features: *industrialisation* and *cultural homogeneity*. As several critics have already pointed out (Hall 1998), both these features create difficulties for Gellner's theory.

To begin with the most obvious cases, the linkages between *industria* and nationalism in late-developing countries are tenuous. In the nineteenth-century Balkans, for instance, nationalist ideologies as well as the building of nation-states occurred in a context where large-scale industrialisation simply did not exist. Here the relatively rapid development of nationalist ideologies before and during the nation-building process took place at least a century before we can call these societies industrial.

(the *bête noire* of Greek nationalist historians), which deny any biological and even cultural connection between ancient and modern Greeks (see Skopelea 1997); as well as theories that do not consider Byzantium as the vital link between ancient and modern Greece (see on this point Dimaras 1986: 70ff). For Paparrigopoulos there can be no question of the unbroken continuity from ancient Greece via the Hellenistic empires and Byzantium to the modern Greek state. Throughout the ages he detects the hand of Divine Providence guiding the Greek ethnos in its unique destiny (Dimaras 1986: 183ff).

In 1870, for example, non-industrial Greece had seven times more civil servants per 10,000 population than the United Kingdom (Mouzelis 1986: 11). Pre-industrial Greece therefore experienced the phenomenal growth of a state bureaucracy penetrating the periphery in a non-industrial or proto-industrial context.[10]

Gellner may defend his theory by pointing out that it focuses on countries where nationalism had already emerged. But even if we confine ourselves to the West, in the light of what was said above (about inter-state struggles and state penetration rather than market expansion as the motor force of modernity), it is reasonable to argue that even in its birth-place nationalism precedes rather than follows the large-scale development and eventual dominance of industrial capitalism (in the late nineteenth century).

Similar difficulties arise with the second core characteristic of Gellner's theory, that of cultural homogeneity. According to Gellner,

> there is a kind of inverse relationship between the importance of structure and culture. In a highly structured society, culture is not indispensable. Where relationships are fairly well-known (because the community is small, and because the types of relationship are small in number), shared culture is not a precondition of effective communication. (Gellner 1969: 154)

In industrial, complex societies on the other hand, where roles are more flexible and 'a man is not fully identified with his role, and can if he wishes divest himself of his role' (Gellner 1969: 155), communication via a *common cultural mediu*m becomes crucial. Therefore, national culture rather than structure becomes of the utmost importance. Because of this, nationalism entails a strong tendency towards the homogenisation of culture. Nationalism as a relatively context-free medium of communication and coordination of the actions of 'modular' subjects is based on a set of common cultural elements (language, religious beliefs, myths, etc.) inimical to the coexistence of other sets of common cultural elements shared by other groups within the same polity. When Gellner's critics refer to cases where cultural homogeneity does not exist (e.g. Switzerland, Canada, Belgium), defenders of his theory can argue that in such cases there is quasi-homogeneity – in the sense of an articulation of different cultures within which one is dominant (Hall 2005).

However, Gellner's theory clearly makes the assumption that in multicultural cases there will be a strong tendency for peripheral cultures to be eliminated by peaceful (e.g. cultural absorption) or more drastic

[10] A similar point can be made about the southern cone countries of Latin America (see Mouzelis 1986: 3–73).

means (e.g. ethnic cleansing, forced population exchanges, adjustment of national boundaries, etc.). His theory does not at all allow for cases of *relative multicultural stability* as in the cases mentioned above, or in the type of multiculturalism seen today in most developed societies hosting a large number of immigrants from poor countries.

The above difficulties can be much attenuated if Gellner's notion of *industria* is replaced by the concept of modernity conceptualised in terms of the two structural features already discussed: unmediated state penetration of the periphery, and top-down differentiation of industrial spheres. In terms of these two basic structural dimensions we can construct a fourfold typology of nationalism. To put this schematically:

In Box 1 we have high state penetration of the periphery and high top-down differentiation. This type of 'classical' nationalism characterises the majority of developed capitalist nation-states.

In Box 2 we have a high differentiation but low penetration of the central state administrative apparatus. This is the case of confederal polities like Switzerland, where the cantons enjoy a great deal of autonomy vis-à-vis the national government in matters ranging from education and migration to welfare policies. In the Swiss case of 'confederate nationalism' we have stable articulation of three identities: the national (Swiss), the regional (e.g. French) and the cantonal (e.g. Genevois).

In Box 3 we have high state penetration of the periphery but without full differentiation. The case of Iran suitably illustrates this variant of Arab nationalism. While given modern communicative technologies, the centralised state apparatus does penetrate the periphery, there is relatively low differentiation between religious, educational, juridical and political roles on both the national and the regional/local levels. Borrowing from the Parsonian conceptual armoury,[11] we can label this type of nationalism diffuse, given the lack of role specificity in low differentiation.

Box 4 finally (low state penetration and low differentiation) refers to the cases of several African polities where, as John Hall has put it, nationalist ideas do not extend beyond the boundaries of their capital city (2005: 21), the periphery being organised along tribal/segmental lines. In this type of 'proto-nationalism', the administrative penetration of the central state apparatus is minimal, and the shifting of loyalties from the segmental periphery to the national 'imagined community' is very feeble. Such cases can hardly be called nation-states therefore.[12]

[11] The dilemma of diffuse versus specific orientation to a social situation is one of the famous five-pattern variables of Parsonian sociology (see Parsons 1964b: 322–5).

[12] By nation-state in the sense used here I do not mean one nation in one state. I mean a state characterised by unmediated bureaucratic penetration and by top-down differentiation.

Primordialism versus constructionism

I suggest that the above typology of nationalism guards better against exceptions than Gellner's, and at the same time links the nationalist phenomenon with features of modernity which, much more *directly* than his *industria*, show its constructed rather than primordial character. Take for instance the transfer from the periphery to the centre, of identifications and attachments, the famous move from 'peasant to French person' (Renan 1882/1990). Gellner is right when he points out, contra Anthony Smith (1986, 1991), that the crucial factor for explaining that transfer is not cultural continuity[13] which may or may not exist (Gellner 1996; Calhoun 1997: 53–7).

But if the construction of national identities has very little to do with primordialism, it may have equally little to do with industrialisation, whereas it has always had very much to do with the process of state expansion and penetration of the periphery. This is to say that what is most crucial for the formation of national attachments is the drawing-in process that occurs with the construction of national systems of taxation, education, postal communication, military service, etc. As 'modular individuals' are pulled into the numerous national arenas, there is a shift of symbolic resources from the periphery to the centre. This shift can be concretely measured by the multiplication of direct linkages between the citizens and the administrative mechanisms of the central state apparatus. To come back to our Greek example, whereas in premodern, prenationalist times a peasant on the Greek mainland had little direct relationship with the Ottoman patrimonial administration, once the Greek state was established his/her direct linkages with the expanding state bureaucracy multiplied exponentially. It is this rather than continuity with primordial values and beliefs and/or industrialisation that explains the transition from peasant to citizen.

The issue of functionalism

Gellner has made it crystal clear that his theory is not based on *teleological* functionalism. He rightly points out that it does not explain the emergence of nationalism in terms of *industria*'s *needs* for a context-free, literary medium of communication. He explicitly states that it is methodologically wrong to transform needs into causes. His non-teleological functionalism simply posits an *elective affinity* between *industria* and nationalism

[13] For a defence of the primordialism/cultural continuity argument, see Hutchison (1994), Smith (1986, 1991) and Greenfeld (1992).

(Mouzelis 1998: 160–2). As far as this study is concerned, I find the methodology perfectly legitimate, but consider that the elective affinity is less between *industria* and nationalism than between modernity (conceptualised as unmediated state penetration and top-down differentiation) and nationalism.

Elective affinity means that whenever nationalist and non-nationalist discourses coexist in a context characterised by unmediated state penetration and top-down differentiation, the former has greater chances of becoming dominant. When this does not happen, when the shift from local/regional to central state identification does not take place, then the polities concerned have little chances of survival in a world dominated by nation-states (i.e. by states with highly developed 'infrastructural powers').

This becomes obvious if we take into account the key role that inter-state struggles play in the survival of a polity. In premodern European absolutism, for instance, the French model of centralised patrimonialism (as shaped by Louis XIV and his successors) rapidly spread to the rest of continental Europe, all major states adopting more centralised forms of tax collecting, army organisation, population surveillance, etc. Given this new system of inter-state relations, any state that failed to centralise (e.g. Poland) was condemned to peripheralisation, partition or extinction (Anderson 1974). Something similar happened when the inter-state system of European absolutism gave way to the system of European nation-states (eighteenth to nineteenth centuries). If European absolutism entailed the centralisation of the means of violence and taxation at the top, the nation-state (as already argued) dramatically accentuated the process of centralisation. Unlike all premodern states (including the absolutist one), the bureaucratic machinery of the nation-state destroyed segmental localism and drew the whole population into broader economic, political and cultural arenas of the national centre (Bendix 1969; Nettl 1967). Once the inter-state system of nation-states was consolidated, any state failing to 'modernise' (i.e. to make the shift from segmental localism to differentiated national arenas) tended to become peripheral or to break up (e.g. the Ottoman, Romanov and Habsburg imperial states).

Summary and conclusion

(a) A way to restructure Gellner's theory of nationalism so as better to satisfy its numerous critics is to replace his concept of *industria* with that of modernity, the latter notion being conceptualised in structural rather than cultural terms.

(b) There are two structural features which distinguish modern from pre-modern social formations. The first refers to the destruction of segmental localism and the mobilisation and inclusion of the whole population into the centre. This is achieved via the unprecedented and unmediated state penetration of the periphery. From this perspective nationalism can be conceptualised as a discourse by political elites trying to reduce the autonomy of local potentates and concentrate the means of production, of domination/violence and of persuasion/education at the top.

(c) The second unique structural characteristic of modernity entails the top-down differentiation of institutional spheres, each sphere portraying, at least potentially, its own logic and values. From this more systemic/functionalist perspective, nationalism can be seen as one of the main mechanisms that integrates a social formation's differentiated institutional spheres.

(d) I have tried to illustrate the utility of the above conceptualisation of nationalism by (i) applying it to the development of nineteenth-century Greek nationalism, and (ii) constructing a fourfold typology of nationalism based on the notions of unmediated state penetration of the periphery and of top-down differentiation (classical nationalism, confederal nationalism, diffuse nationalism and proto-nationalism).

(e) In the light of the above I have examined briefly the primordialism-versus-constructionism debate, as well as the issue of functionalist explanations of nationalism, both teleological and non-teleological.

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